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Abstract We present novel perfect secrecy systems
that provide immunity to spoofing attacks under equi-
probable source probability distributions. On the theo-
retical side, relying on an existence result for t-designs
by Teirlinck, our construction method constructively
generates systems that can reach an arbitrary high level
of security. On the practical side, we obtain, via cyclic
difference families, very efficient constructions of new
optimal systems that are onefold secure against spoof-
ing. Moreover, we construct, by means of t-designs for
large values of t, the first near-optimal systems that are
5- and 6-fold secure as well as further systems with a
feasible number of keys that are 7-fold secure against
spoofing. We apply our results furthermore to a re-
cently extended authentication model, where the op-
ponent has access to a verification oracle. We obtain
this way novel perfect secrecy systems with immunity
to spoofing in the verification oracle model.
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1 Introduction
Perfect secrecy systems (or codes) play a prominent role
in information theory and cryptography. In terms of in-
formation theoretic security, these systems shall ensure
protection of the confidentiality of sensitive informa-
tion in the presence of eavesdropping. The information
theoretic, or unconditional, security model does not de-
pend on any complexity assumptions and hence cannot
be broken given unlimited computational resources. A
well-known example of a perfect secrecy system is Ver-
nam’s One-time Pad. In his landmark paper “Com-
munication theory of secrecy systems” [23], Shannon
established a fundamental characterization of optimal
perfect secrecy systems: A key-minimal secrecy system
achieves perfect secrecy if and only if the encryption
matrix is a Latin square and the keys are used with
equal probability. Important generalizations have been
obtained since then (see, e.g., [11,26,27]). In addition to
the concept of perfect secrecy, various scenarios require
that the systems provide robustness against spoofing
attacks. Concerning the aspect of authenticity, the in-
tegrity of information that is communicated via a po-
tentially insecure channel shall be assured. Often such
constructions involve a variety of tools from combina-
torics (see, e.g., [13, 15, 16, 20, 26]).
In this paper, we present novel perfect secrecy sys-
tems that provide immunity to spoofing attacks un-
der equiprobable source probability distributions. In
the past decades various perfect secrecy systems have
been constructed that offer zero (like Vernam’s One-
time Pad) or onefold security against spoofing. Recently,
in [13], the first infinite classes of optimal perfect se-
crecy systems that achieve twofold security have been
constructed as well as further optimal systems that offer
up to 4-fold security against spoofing under equiproba-
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ble source probability distributions. This has been
achieved by means of particular Steiner t-designs, e.g.,
the famous 5-(12, 6, 1) Witt design. However, as Steiner
t-designs are not known to exist for t > 5, the level of
security cannot be augmented any further via this ap-
proach. In the present paper, we develop a more general
construction method, which allows us to use t-designs
for higher values of t under equiprobable source prob-
ability distributions. On the theoretical side, relying
on Teirlinck’s existence result for t-designs [28], our
method constructively generates systems that can reach
an arbitrary high security level. On the practical side,
by using cyclic difference families, we give very effi-
cient constructions of new optimal systems that are one-
fold secure against spoofing. By employing t-designs for
large values of t, we also present the first near-optimal
systems that are 5- and 6-fold secure as well as further
systems with a feasible number of keys that are 7-fold
secure against spoofing. Moreover, we apply our results
to an extended authentication model, where the op-
ponent has access to a verification oracle. This model,
which has been recently introduced and investigated
in [1, 21, 29, 30], allows a more powerful pro-active at-
tack scenario. The opponent may send a message of the
opponent’s choice to the receiver and observe the re-
ceiver’s response whether or not the receiver accepts it
as authentic. This can be modeled in terms of a verifica-
tion oracle with an online/offline variant that provides
a response to a query message in the same way as the
message would be accepted or not by the legitimate re-
ceiver. We obtain this way novel perfect secrecy systems
with immunity to spoofing attacks in the verification
oracle model.
The organization of the paper is as follows: The un-
derlying information theoretic Shannon–Simmons model
is given in Section 2. Section 3 introduces background
material on combinatorial structures that is important
for our further purposes. Section 4 presents a short
overview of known constructions of perfect secrecy sys-
tems that provide robustness against spoofing attacks.
In Section 5, a general construction method is devel-
oped and we examine the level of security from a theo-
retical point of view. The subsequent two sections deal
then with the practical side: we give explicit construc-
tions of optimal systems with onefold immunity to spoof-
ing in Section 6, and of near-optimal and other feasible
systems with multifold immunity in Section 7. In Sec-
tion 8, we apply our constructions to the verification
oracle model. The paper is concluded in Section 9.
2 The Shannon–Simmons Model
We rely on the information theoretic (or unconditional)
secrecy model developed by Shannon [23], and by Sim-
mons (e.g., [24, 25]) including authentication. Our no-
tation follows, for the most part, that of [19,26]. In this
model of authentication and secrecy three participants
are involved: a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent.
The transmitter wants to communicate information to
the receiver via a public communications channel. The
receiver in return would like to be confident that any re-
ceived information actually came from the transmitter
and not from some opponent (integrity of information).
The transmitter and the receiver are assumed to trust
each other. This is known as an authentication system
(or authentication code, A-code).
In what follows, let S denote a set of k source states
(or plaintexts), M a set of v messages (or ciphertexts),
and E a set of b encoding rules (or keys). Using an en-
coding rule e ∈ E , the transmitter encrypts a source
state s ∈ S to obtain the message m = e(s) to be sent
over the channel. The encoding rule is an injective func-
tion from S toM, and is communicated to the receiver
via a secure channel prior to any messages being sent.
For each encoding rule e ∈ E , letM(e) := {e(s) : s ∈ S}
denote the set of valid messages. A received message
m will be accepted by the receiver as being authentic
if and only if m ∈ M(e). When this is fulfilled, the re-
ceiver decrypts the messagem by applying the decoding
rule e−1, where
e−1(m) = s⇔ e(s) = m.
An authentication system can be represented algebrai-
cally by a (b × k)-encoding matrix with the rows in-
dexed by the encoding rules, the columns indexed by
the source states, and the entries defined by aes := e(s)
(1 ≤ e ≤ b, 1 ≤ s ≤ k).
Concerning authenticity, we address the following
scenario, called spoofing attack of order i (cf. [19]): Sup-
pose that an opponent observes i ≥ 0 distinct mes-
sages, which are sent through the public channel using
the same encoding rule. The opponent then inserts a
new message m′ (being distinct from the i messages al-
ready sent), hoping to have it accepted by the receiver
as authentic. The cases i = 0 and i = 1 are called im-
personation game and substitution game, respectively.
These cases have been studied in detail in recent years,
whereas less is known for higher orders.
For any i, we assume that there is some probabil-
ity distribution on the set of i-subsets of source states,
so that any set of i source states has a non-zero prob-
ability of occurring. For simplification, we ignore the
order in which the i source states occur, and assume
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that no source state occurs more than once. Given this
probability distribution pS on S, the receiver and trans-
mitter choose a probability distribution pE on E (called
encoding strategy) with associated independent random
variables S and E, respectively. These distributions are
known to all participants and induce a third distribu-
tion, pM , on M with associated random variable M .
The deception probability Pdi is the probability that
the opponent can deceive the receiver with a spoofing
attack of order i. Combinatorial lower bounds can be
given as follows (cf. [19]).
Theorem 1 (Massey) In an authentication system
with k source states and v messages, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ t,
the deception probabilities are bounded below by
Pdi ≥
k − i
v − i
.
An authentication system is called t-fold secure
against spoofing if Pdi = (k− i)/(v− i) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
The following theorem (cf. [19,22]) establishes a combi-
natorial lower bound on the number of encoding rules
for this kind of attack.
Theorem 2 (Massey–Scho¨bi) If an authentication
system is (t− 1)-fold against spoofing, then the number
of encoding rules is bounded below by
b ≥
(
v
t
)
(
k
t
) .
Such a system is called optimal if the number of
encoding rules meets the lower bound with equality.
Concerning secrecy, we recall Shannon’s fundamen-
tal idea of perfect secrecy (cf. [23]): An authentication
system is said to have perfect secrecy if
pS(s|m) = pS(s)
for every source state s ∈ S and every messagem ∈M.
That is, the a posteriori probability that the source
state is s, given that the messagem is observed, is iden-
tical to the a priori probability that the source state is
s. From Bayes’ Theorem follows that
pS(s|m) =
∑
{e∈E:e(s)=m} pE(e)pS(s)∑
{e∈E:m∈M(e)} pE(e)pS(e
−1(m))
.
This yields:
Lemma 1 (Stinson) An authentication system has per-
fect secrecy if and only if∑
{e∈E:e(s)=m}
pE(e) =
∑
{e∈E:m∈M(e)}
pE(e)pS(e
−1(m))
for every source state s ∈ S and every message m ∈ M.
Therefore, if the encoding rules in a system are used
with equal probability, then a given message m occurs
with the same frequency in each column of the encoding
matrix.
3 Combinatorial Structures
We give in this section some background material on
combinatorial structures that is important for our fur-
ther purposes. Let us assume that t ≤ k ≤ v and λ are
positive integers.
Definition 1 Let G be a finite additive Abelian group
of order v. A difference family DF(v, k, λ) over G is a
family F = {D1, . . . , Dl} of subsets of G, satisfying the
following properties:
(i) |Di| = k for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
(ii) the multiset union
l⋃
i=1
{x− y : x, y ∈ Di, x 6= y}
contains every nonzero element ofG exactly λ times.
The sets D1, . . . , Dl are called base blocks. A differ-
ence family with a single base block is called a differ-
ence set. A DF(v, k, λ) with G isomorphic to the cyclic
group Cv of order v is called a cyclic difference family
and denoted by CDF(v, k, λ).
We recall the notion of authentication perpendicular
arrays. These combinatorial structures are generaliza-
tions of Latin squares.
Definition 2 An authentication perpendicular array
APAλ(t, k, v) is a λ
(
v
t
)
×k array, A, of v symbols, which
satisfies the following properties:
(i) every row of A contains k distinct symbols,
(ii) for any t columns of A, and for any t distinct sym-
bols, there are precisely λ rows r of A such that the
t given symbols all occur in row r in the given t
columns,
(iii) for any s ≤ t − 1 and for any s + 1 distinct sym-
bols {xi}
s+1
i=1 , it holds that among all the rows of A
that contain all the symbols {xi}
s+1
i=1 , the s symbols
{xi}
s
i=1 occur in all possible subsets of s columns
equally often.
We present a simple example (due to van Rees,
cf. [27]):
Example 1 A 55 × 3 array A can be constructed by
developing the five rows
0 1 2
0 9 7
0 3 6
0 4 8
0 5 10
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modulo 11. Every pair {x1, x2} occurs in three rows of
A. Within these three rows, x1 occurs once in each of
the three columns, as does x2. This gives an
APA1(2, 3, 11).
We recall furthermore the definition of combinato-
rial t-designs.
Definition 3 A t-(v, k, λ) design D is a pair (X,B),
which satisfies the following properties:
(i) X is a set of v elements, called points,
(ii) B is a family of k-subsets of X , called blocks,
(iii) every t-subset of X is contained in exactly λ blocks.
We will denote points by lower-case and blocks by
upper-case Latin letters. Via convention, let b := |B|
denote the number of blocks. Throughout this work,
‘repeated blocks’ are not allowed, that is, the same
k-subset of points may not occur twice as a block. If
t < k < v holds, then we speak of a non-trivial t-design.
For historical reasons, a t-(v, k, λ) design with λ = 1 is
called a Steiner t-design (sometimes also a Steiner sys-
tem). If D = (X,B) is a t-(v, k, λ) design with t ≥ 2,
and x ∈ X arbitrary, then the derived design with
respect to x is Dx = (Xx,Bx), where Xx = X\{x},
Bx = {B\{x} : x ∈ B ∈ B}. In this case,D is also called
an extension of Dx. Obviously, Dx is a (t − 1)-
(v − 1, k − 1, λ) design.
For the existence of t-designs, basic necessary con-
ditions can be obtained via elementary counting argu-
ments (see, for instance, [2]):
Lemma 2 Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design, and
for a positive integer s ≤ t, let S ⊆ X with |S| = s.
Then the number of blocks containing each element of
S is given by
λs = λ
(
v−s
t−s
)
(
k−s
t−s
) .
In particular, for t ≥ 2, a t-(v, k, λ) design is also an
s-(v, k, λs) design.
It is customary to set r := λ1 denoting the number
of blocks containing a given point. It follows
Lemma 3 Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design. Then
the following holds:
(a) bk = vr.
(b)
(
v
t
)
λ = b
(
k
t
)
.
(c) r(k − 1) = λ2(v − 1) for t ≥ 2.
The next result (cf. [26]) uses t-designs in order
to construct authentication perpendicular arrays. Fur-
ther similar recursive constructions have been obtained
in [31].
Theorem 3 (Stinson–Teirlinck) Suppose there is a
t-(v, k, λ) design and an authentication perpendicular
array APAλ′(t, k, k), then there is an APAλ·λ′(t, k, v).
Concerning the existence of t-designs, a seminal re-
sult by Teirlinck [28] shows that there exist non-trivial
t-designs for all possible values of t.
Theorem 4 (Teirlinck) For given integers t and v
with v ≡ t (mod (t + 1)!2t+1) and v ≥ t+ 1 > 0, there
exists a t-(v, t+ 1, (t+ 1)!2t+1) design.
Teirlinck’s recursive construction methods are con-
structive. However, for a given t, they result in t-designs
with extremely large values for v and λ. For exam-
ple, the smallest parameters for the case t = 7 are
7-(4032015 + 7, 8, 4032015). Until now no non-trivial
Steiner t-design with t > 5 has been found. Highly
regular examples have been proven not to exist (cf.,
e.g., [12]). We refer the reader to [2,9] for encyclopedic
accounts of key results in combinatorial design theory.
Various connections of t-designs with coding and in-
formation theory can be found in a recent survey [14]
(with many additional references therein).
4 Constructions using Combinatorial
Structures
4.1 Equiprobable Source Probability Distribution
When the source states are known to be independent
and equiprobable, authentication systems which are
(t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing can be constructed
via t-designs (cf. [10, 22, 26]).
Theorem 5 (De Soete–Scho¨bi–Stinson) Suppose
there is a t-(v, k, λ) design. Then there is an authen-
tication system for k equiprobable source states, hav-
ing v messages and λ
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is
(t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing. Conversely, if there
is an authentication system for k equiprobable source
states, having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules,
that is (t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing, then there is
a Steiner t-(v, k, 1) design.
With a focus on optimal constructions, the above re-
sult has been modified in [26] and generalized recently
in [13] to include also the aspect of perfect secrecy. In
particular, the first infinite classes of optimal perfect se-
crecy systems that achieve twofold security have been
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constructed in [13] as well as further optimal systems
that offer 3- and 4-fold security against spoofing. We
give in Table 1 all presently known optimal perfect se-
crecy systems that are t-fold secure against spoofing
with t ≥ 1 under equiprobable source probability dis-
tributions.
4.2 Arbitrary Source Probability Distribution
For arbitrary source probability distributions, basically
two construction methods have been developed for per-
fect secrecy systems that offer security against spoofing
attacks (cf. [6,7,26,31]). These constructions inherently
require larger numbers of encoding rules for achieving
the same level of security. One of the two methods with
the smaller number of encoding rules requires λ
(
v
t
)
en-
coding rules when we want the perfect secrecy systems
with k source states and v messages to be (t − 1)-fold
secure against spoofing (indeed, these systems achieve
perfect t-fold secrecy), and is based on authentication
perpendicular arrays APAλ(t, k, v), cf. [26, Thm. 3.3].
For t ≥ 6, there are — apart from two infinite se-
Table 1 Optimal perfect secrecy systems from Steiner de-
signs that are t-fold secure against spoofing attacks
t k v b = bopt Ref.
1 q + 1 q
d+1
−1
q−1
v(v−1)
k(k−1)
[26]
q prime power d ≥ 2 even
1 3 v ≡ 1 (mod 6) v(v−1)
6
[13]
1 4 v ≡ 1 (mod 12) v(v−1)
12
[13]
1 5 v ≡ 1 (mod 20) v(v−1)
20
[13]
2 q + 1 qd + 1 v(v−1)(v−2)
k(k−1)(k−2)
[13]
q prime power d ≥ 2 even
2 4 v ≡ 2, 10 (mod 24) v(v−1)(v−2)
24
[13]
2 5 26 260 [13]
5 11 66 [13]
7 23 253 [13]
5 23 1,771 [13]
5 47 35,673 [13]
3 5 83 367,524 [13]
5 71 194,327 [13]
5 107 1,032,122 [13]
5 131 2,343,328 [13]
5 167 6,251,311 [13]
5 243 28,344,492 [13]
6 12 132 [13]
4 6 84 5,145,336 [13]
6 244 1,152,676,008 [13]
ries with extremely large values of λ — only a very
small number of authentication perpendicular arrays
APAλ(t, k, v) known. These have been constructed via
Theorem 3 or similar results using t-designs. All these
APAλ(t, k, v) have t ≤ 8, and for t = 6 all have λ ≥ 24,
for t = 7 all have λ ≥ 70, and for t = 8 all have λ ≥ 280.
The two infinite series were constructed by Tran van
Trung [31] and have parameters v ≥ k, k = 2t resp.
2t+ 1, and λ = t!2
(
v−t
t
)
/6! resp. (t+ 1)t!2
(
v−t
t+1
)
/6!.
5 A General Construction Method &
Theoretical Point of View
We present a construction method for designing per-
fect secrecy systems that provide immunity to spoofing
attacks under equiprobable source probability distribu-
tions.
Theorem 6 Suppose there is a t-(v, k, λ) design, where
v divides the number of blocks b = λ
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
. Then there
is a perfect secrecy system for k equiprobable source
states, having v messages and b encoding rules, that is
(t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing. Moreover, the sys-
tem is optimal if and only if λ = 1.
Proof Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design, where
v divides b = λ
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
. It follows from Theorem 5
that the system is (t− 1)-fold secure against spoof-
ing attacks. Thus, it remains to verify that the sys-
tem also achieves perfect secrecy when we assume that
the encoding rules are used with equal probability. By
Lemma 1, this means that a given message must occur
with the same frequency in each column of the result-
ing encoding matrix. This can be achieved by ordering
every block of D in such a way that every point occurs
in each possible position in precisely b/v blocks. Since
every point occurs in exactly r = λ
(
v−1
t−1
)
/
(
k−1
t−1
)
blocks
in view of Lemma 3 (c), necessarily k must divide r. By
Lemma 3 (b), this is equivalent to saying that v divides
b. To show that the condition is also sufficient, we may
consider the bipartite point-block incidence graph of D
with vertex set X ∪ B, where (x,B) defines an edge if
and only if x ∈ B for x ∈ X and B ∈ B. An ordering on
each block of D can be obtained via an edge-coloring
of this graph using k colors in such a way that each
vertex B ∈ B is adjacent to one edge of each color,
and each vertex x ∈ X is adjacent to b/v edges of each
color. Technically, this can be achieved by first splitting
up each vertex x into b/v copies, each having degree
k, and then by finding an appropriate edge-coloring of
the resulting k-regular bipartite graph using k colors.
We can now take the ordered blocks as encoding rules,
each used with equal probability. Moreover, optimality
occurs if and only if λ = 1 in view of Theorem 2. ⊓⊔
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We note that the special case when λ = 1 has been
treated in [13, Thm. 6].
Using Theorem 4, we may constructively generate
systems that can reach an arbitrary high level of secu-
rity against spoofing.
Theorem 7 For all integers t and v with v ≡ t (mod
(t + 1)!2t+1) and v ≥ t + 1 > 0, there exists a perfect
secrecy system for t+1 equiprobable source states, hav-
ing v messages and b = (t + 1)!2tt!
(
v
t
)
encoding rules,
that is (t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing.
Proof For the given design parameters, the division prop-
erty v | b holds:
v | λ
(
v
t
)
(
k
t
) ⇔ k(k − 1) · · · (k − t+ 1) | λ(v − 1) · · · (v − t+ 1)
⇔ (t+ 1)! | (t+ 1)!2t+1(v − 1) · · · (v − t+ 1).
Therefore, the claim follows by applying Theorem 6.
⊓⊔
6 Explicit Constructions (I): Onefold Immunity
We give in this section very efficient constructions of
new optimal systems that are onefold secure against
spoofing.
Theorem 8 If there exists a difference family
DF(v, k, λ) over a finite additive Abelian group G of
order v, then there is a perfect secrecy system for k
equiprobable source states, having v messages and b =
λv(v−1)/(k2−k) encoding rules, that is onefold secure
against spoofing. Moreover, the system is optimal if and
only if λ = 1.
Proof Let F = {D1, . . . , Dl} be a DF(v, k, λ) over G.
We shall need the two basic facts:
• Since l = λ(v−1)
k(k−1) is a positive integer, we have
λ(v − 1) ≡ 0 (mod k(k − 1)) (∗).
• Let OrbG(Di) = {Di+g : g ∈ G} denote the G-orbit
of Di. Then the union
l⋃
i=1
OrbG(Di)
forms the family of blocks of a 2-(v, k, λ) design ad-
mitting G as a group of automorphisms acting reg-
ularly (i.e., sharply transitively) on the points and
semiregularly on the blocks.
Thus, by (∗) and Lemma 3, we have v | b, and the
requirements for applying Theorem 6 are fulfilled. ⊓⊔
Table 2 Perfect secrecy system from a cyclic difference family
CDF(13, 3, 1).
s1 s2 s3
e1 0 1 4
e2 1 2 5
e3 2 3 6
e4 3 4 7
e5 4 5 8
e6 5 6 9
e7 6 7 10
e8 7 8 11
e9 8 9 12
e10 9 10 0
e11 10 11 1
e12 11 12 2
e13 12 0 3
e14 0 2 7
e15 1 3 8
e16 2 4 9
e17 3 5 10
e18 4 6 11
e19 5 7 12
e20 6 8 0
e21 7 9 1
e22 8 10 2
e23 9 11 3
e24 10 12 4
e25 11 0 5
e26 12 1 6
In particular, when F = {D1, . . . , Dl} is a
CDF(v, k, λ), then a perfect secrecy system can be con-
structed very efficiently due to the extremely simple
form of its encoding matrix (cf. Table 2). We note that
the special case when l = 1 in the above theorem has
been considered in [26, Thm. 6.5&Remark]. In this case,
the respective cyclic difference set is a Singer difference
set yielding a projective plane of prime power order as
symmetric cyclic Steiner 2-design (i.e., v = b). We give
an example of a perfect secrecy systems constructed via
Theorem 8 based on a CDF(13, 3, 1).
Example 2 A CDF(13, 3, 1) has two base blocks D1 =
{0, 1, 4} and D2 = {0, 2, 7}. The orbits of D1 and D2
immediately form an encoding matrix as given in Ta-
ble 2. The perfect secrecy system, having 3 equiproba-
ble source states, 13 messages and 26 encoding rules, is
optimal and offers onefold security against spoofing.
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Example 3 The following infinite ((i)-(iii)) and finite
((iv)-(v)) families of cyclic difference families
CDF(q, k, 1) with q a prime power are known (cf. [8]
and the references therein; [9]):
(i) For k = 3, 4 and 5, respectively, a CDF(q, k, 1) exists
for all prime powers q ≡ 1 (mod k(k − 1)).
(ii) A CDF(q, 6, 1) exists for all prime powers q ≡ 1
(mod 30) with the exception q = 61.
(iii) A CDF(q, 7, 1) exists for all prime powers q ≡ 1
(mod 42) with the exception q = 43, and the pos-
sible exceptions q = 127, 211, 316 as well a q ∈
[261239791, 1.236597× 1013] such that (−3)
q−1
14 = 1
in Fq.
(iv) A CDF(q, 8, 1) exists for all prime powers q ≡ 1
(mod 56) < 104, with the possible exceptions q =
113, 169, 281, 337.
(v) A CDF(q, 9, 1) exists for all prime powers q ≡ 1
(mod 72) < 104, with the possible exceptions q =
289, 361.
Hence, in all these cases a perfect secrecy system for
k equiprobable source states, having q messages and
q(q − 1)/(k2 − k) encoding rules, that is optimal and
onefold secure against spoofing can be constructed very
efficiently.
7 Explicit Constructions (II): Multifold
Immunity
We construct in this section the first near-optimal sys-
tems that are 5- and 6-fold secure as well as further
systems with a feasible number of keys that are 7-fold
secure against spoofing. Recall that number of encod-
ing rules in Theorem 6 is λ times the lower bound of
Theorem 2. In order to construct perfect secrecy sys-
tems with a high level of security against spoofing, we
are therefore interested in t-designs with large t and
small values of λ. These designs must satisfy the divis-
ibility condition v | b = λ
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
of Theorem 6. When
2 ≤ λ ≤ 10, we call such a system near-optimal.
Relying on the Kramer–Mesner method [18], various
t-designs with large t have been constructed in recent
years under some prescribed groups of automorphisms
(cf. [3–5, 17]). We give some examples related to our
considerations.
Example 4 A 6-(19, 7, 4) design and three 6-(19, 7, 6)
designs have been constructed in [3] by prescribing the
groups Hol(C17)++ and Hol(C19), respectively (where
the + operator adds a fixed point to a permutation
group). The only known two smaller 6-(14, 7, 4) designs
have C13+ as a prescribed group of automorphisms, but
do not satisfy our divisibility condition. The only known
Table 3 Near-optimal perfect secrecy systems from 6- and
7-designs that are 5- and 6-fold secure against spoofing at-
tacks
t k v b bopt Design Parameters
7 19 4× bopt 3,876 6-(19, 7, 4)
7 22 8× bopt 10,659 6-(22, 7, 8)
5 7 23 4× bopt 14,421 6-(23, 7, 4)
7 25 6× bopt 25,300 6-(25, 7, 6)
7 32 6× bopt 129,456 6-(32, 7, 6)
8 24 8× bopt 43,263 7-(24, 8, 8)
6 8 26 6× bopt 82,225 7-(26, 8, 6)
8 33 10 × bopt 534,006 7-(33, 8, 10)
further 6-design with λ = 4 has parameters 6-(23, 7, 4),
and is derived from the unique 7-(24, 8, 4) design with
PSL(2, 23) as a prescribed group of automorphisms.
Example 5 There are 7-(24, 8, λ) designs admitting
PSL(2, 23) with possible values λ = 4, . . . , 8. How-
ever, only for λ = 8 the divisibility condition is ful-
filled. There exist 7-(26, 8, 6) designs, which have been
constructed with PGL(2, 25) as a prescribed group of
automorphisms (cf. [3]).
Example 6 The construction of 8-(31, 10, 100) designs
has been established in [5] with PSL(3, 5) as a pre-
scribed group of automorphisms. The only known 8-
designs with smaller λ are 8-(31, 10, 93) designs admit-
ting PSL(3, 5) again, but do not satisfy the divisibility
condition.
We present in Table 3 all near-optimal perfect se-
crecy systems that are 5- and 6-fold secure against spoof-
ing under equiprobable source probability distributions.
We give the parameters of the systems as well as of the
respective designs. We also indicate the optimal number
bopt of encoding rules with respect to Theorem 2. All
presently known t-designs with t > 5 and λ ≤ 10 have
been considered. We generally remark that all known
t-(v, k, λ) designs with t > 5 have λ ≥ 4. Furthermore,
three infinite series of 6-designs are known, however, for
each λ increases rapidly.
In Table 4, we give further perfect secrecy systems
with a feasible number of encoding rules that are 7-fold
secure against spoofing under equiprobable source prob-
ability distributions. All presently known t-designs with
t > 7 and λ ≤ 3,000 have been considered.
We refer to the above references for further infor-
mation on the respective designs.
Remark 1 As indicated in Table 3, a perfect secrecy
system, constructed from a 6-(23, 7, 4) design, with k = 7
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Table 4 Some perfect secrecy systems from 8-designs that
are 7-fold secure against spoofing attacks
t k v b bopt Design Parameters
10 31 100 × bopt 175,305 8-(31, 10, 100)
11 27 432 × bopt 13,455 8-(27, 11, 432)
7 11 36 1,260 × bopt 183,396 8-(36, 11, 1260)
11 40 1,440 × bopt 466,089 8-(40, 11, 1440)
12 27 1,296 × bopt 4,485 8-(27, 12, 1296)
equiprobable source states and v = 23 messages that is
5-fold secure against spoofing requires 57,684 encod-
ing rules. A perfect secrecy system, constructed from
a 6-(25, 7, 6) design, with k = 7 equiprobable source
states and v = 25 messages that is 5-fold secure against
spoofing requires 151,800 encoding rules.
For comparison, a perfect (5-fold) secrecy system,
constructed from an APA10(5, 6, 24), with k = 6 source
states and v = 24 messages that offers 4-fold secu-
rity against spoofing for an arbitrary source probability
distribution requires 425,040 encoding rules. A perfect
(5-fold) secrecy system, constructed from an
APA60(5, 7, 24), with k = 7 source states and v = 24
messages that is 4-fold secure against spoofing for an ar-
bitrary source probability distribution requires 2,550,240
encoding rules (cf. Subsection 4.2).
8 Application to the Verification Oracle Model
We will now consider the scenario, where the oppo-
nent has access to a verification oracle (V-oracle). In
this extended authentication model, we assume that
the opponent is no longer restricted to passively ob-
serving messages transmitted by the sender to the re-
ceiver. The opponent may send a message of the oppo-
nent’s choice to the receiver and observe the receiver’s
response whether or not the receiver accepts it as au-
thentic. This more powerful, pro-active attack scenario
can be modeled in terms of a V-oracle that provides a
response (accept or reject) to a query message in the
same way as the message would be accepted or not
by the legitimate receiver. This attack model was re-
cently introduced in [1, 21]. We recall and slightly ad-
just the notation as far as it is necessary for our con-
sideration. Further details on this model can be found
in [1, 21, 29, 30].
In [29], the two types of online and offline attacks
are studied. In the online attack, the receiver is sup-
posed to respond to each incoming query message, and
thus the opponent is successful as soon as the receiver
accepts a message as authentic. Thus, every query mes-
sage is at the same time a spoofing message. In the of-
fline attack, the query and the spoofing phase are sep-
arated. First, the opponent makes all his queries to the
oracle, and then uses this collected (state) information
to construct a spoofing message. In both scenarios, the
opponent is assumed to be adaptive. The online attack
models an opponent’s interaction with a verification or-
acle such as an ATMmachine, while in the offline attack
the opponent may have captured an offline verification
box. Often, the offline attack model is used as an in-
termediate model for analyzing the online scenario. We
speak in each scenario of a spoofing attack of order i in
the V-oracle model if the opponent has access to i verifi-
cation queries. The opponent’s strategy can be modeled
via probability distributions on the query setM of ver-
ification queries. The online deception probability P onlinedi ,
respectively offline deception probability P offlinedi , denotes
the probability that the opponent can deceive the re-
ceiver with a spoofing attack of order i. In [29], lower
bounds on these deception probabilities have been ob-
tained.
Theorem 9 (Tonien–Safavi-Naini–Wild) In an au-
thentication system with k source states and v mes-
sages, the offline and online deception probabilities in
the V-oracle model are bounded below by
P offlinedi ≥
k
v
and P onlinedi ≥ 1−
(
v−k
i+1
)
(
v
i+1
) , respectively.
Interestingly, it furthermore follows that
P offlinedi =
k
v
if and only if P onlinedi = 1−
(
v−k
i+1
)
(
v
i+1
) .
Thus, an authentication system that attains the
bound in the offline attack is the same as in the online
attack, and vice versa. Clearly, P offlinedi is independent of
i. If the bound for P onlinedi is satisfied with equality, then
also the bound for P onlinedi−1 is satisfied with equality for
i > 1 (cf. [29]). Hence, we call a system t-fold secure
against spoofing in the V-oracle model if P offlinedt =
k
v
or,
equivalently, P onlinedt = 1 −
(v−kt+1)
( vt+1)
. The notation of per-
fect secrecy holds as given in Section 2. An analogue
to Theorem 2 has been derived in [29] for the V-oracle
model.
Theorem 10 (Tonien–Safavi-Naini–Wild) If an
authentication system is (t−1)-fold secure against spoof-
ing in the V-oracle model, then the number of encoding
rules is bounded below by
b ≥
(
v
t
)
(
k
t
) .
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Again, we call a system optimal when the lower
bound holds with equality. For equiprobable source
states, optimal authentication systems which are (t−1)-
fold against spoofing in the V-oracle model have been
characterized in [29]. We give the result in a slightly
more generalized form, which can easily be obtained
from the original proof.
Theorem 11 (Tonien–Safavi-Naini–Wild) Suppose
there is a t-(v, k, λ) design. Then there is an authen-
tication system for k equiprobable source states, hav-
ing v messages and λ ·
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is
(t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing in the V-oracle model.
Conversely, if there is an authentication system for k
equiprobable source states, having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t− 1)-fold secure against spoof-
ing in the V-oracle model, then there is a Steiner
t-(v, k, 1) design.
We will apply now Theorem 6 to construct perfect
secrecy systems that provide a high level of security
against spoofing in the V-oracle model for equiprob-
able source probability distributions. This generalizes
the result [16, Thm. 3.27], where the case λ = 1 has
been treated.
Theorem 12 Suppose there is a t-(v, k, λ) design, where
v divides the number of blocks b = λ
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
. Then there
is a perfect secrecy system for k equiprobable source
states, having v messages and b encoding rules, that
is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing in the V-oracle
model. Moreover, the system is optimal if and only if
λ = 1.
Proof By Theorem 11, the system is (t− 1)-fold secure
against spoofing in the V-oracle model. Under the as-
sumption that the encoding rules are used with equal
probability, we may proceed as in the proof of Theo-
rem 6 to verify that the system also achieves perfect
secrecy. With respect to Theorem 10 optimality is ob-
tained if and only if λ = 1. ⊓⊔
Clearly, Theorem 7 can also be applied to the V-
oracle model.
Theorem 13 For all integers t and v with v ≡ t (mod
(t+1)!2t+1) and v ≥ t+1 > 0, there exists a perfect se-
crecy system for t+1 equiprobable source states, having
v messages and b = (t + 1)!2tt!
(
v
t
)
encoding rules, that
is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing in the V-oracle
model.
All the results in Section 6 and Section 7 may be
transferred accordingly.
9 Conclusion
We have given novel perfect secrecy systems that pro-
vide immunity to spoofing attacks under equiproba-
ble source probability distributions. Our construction
method generalized in a natural manner the approach
in [13] and allowed us to use t-designs instead of merely
Steiner t-designs in the construction process. From a
theoretical point of view, we have shown that based on
Teirlinck’s existence result for t-designs, perfect secrecy
systems can be generated that can reach an arbitrary
high level of security. Concerning explicit constructions,
we have obtained, via cyclic difference families, very ef-
ficient constructions of new optimal systems that are
onefold secure against spoofing. By using t-designs for
large values of t, we have also presented the first near-
optimal systems that are 5- and 6-fold secure as well as
further systems with a feasible number of keys that are
7-fold secure against spoofing. Previous constructions of
multifold secure systems had been known only for arbi-
trary source probability distributions, which inherently
result in larger numbers of encoding rules for achieving
the same level of security. We have furthermore applied
our results to a recently extended authentication model,
where the opponent has access to a verification oracle.
Novel perfect secrecy systems with immunity to spoof-
ing in the verification oracle model have been obtained
this way.
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